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ABSTRACT
Neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks - small visually impercep-
tible crafted noise which when added to the input drastically changes the output.
The most effective method of defending against these adversarial attacks is to
use the methodology of adversarial training. We analyze the adversarially trained
robust models to study their vulnerability against adversarial attacks at the level
of the latent layers. Our analysis reveals that contrary to the input layer which
is robust to adversarial attack, the latent layer of these robust models are highly
susceptible to adversarial perturbations of small magnitude. Leveraging this infor-
mation, we introduce a new technique Latent Adversarial Training (LAT) which
comprises of fine-tuning the adversarially trained models to ensure the robustness
at the feature layers. We also propose Latent Attack (LA), a novel algorithm for
construction of adversarial examples. LAT results in minor improvement in test
accuracy and leads to a state-of-the-art adversarial accuracy against the univer-
sal first-order adversarial PGD attack which is shown for the MNIST, CIFAR-10,
CIFAR-100 datasets.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks have achieved state-of-the-art performance in computer vision tasks such
as image classification (He et al., 2016; Krizhevsky et al., 2012), semantic segmentation (He
et al., 2017) and many others. However, recently such models have been shown to be extremely
vulnerable to adversarial perturbations. These small, carefully calibrated perturbations, when added
to the input, lead to a significant change in the network’s prediction (Szegedy et al., 2014). The
existence of adversarial examples pose a severe security threat to the practical deployment of deep
learning models, particularly, in safety-critical systems (Akhtar & Mian, 2018).
Since the advent of adversarial perturbations, there has been extensive work in the area of craft-
ing new adversarial perturbations (Madry et al., 2018; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017; Carlini &
Wagner, 2017b). At the same time, several methods for adversarial defense have been proposed to
protect models from these attacks (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2018; Trame`r et al., 2018).
Nonetheless, many of these defense strategies are continually defeated by new attacks. (Athalye
et al., 2018; Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; Madry et al., 2018). In order to better compare the defense
strategies, recent methods try to provide robustness guarantees by formally proving that no pertur-
bation smaller than a given lp(where p ∈ [0,∞])bound can fool their network (Raghunathan et al.,
2018; Tsuzuku et al., 2018; Weng et al., 2018; Carlini et al., 2017; Wong & Kolter, 2018). Despite
the efforts, the adversarial defense methods still fail to provide a significant robustness guarantee
for appropriate lp bounds (in terms of accuracy over adversarial examples) for large datasets like
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Figure 1: Adversarial accuracy (left, higher the better) and Lipschitz values (right, lower the better) of latent
layers for models trained using different techniques on CIFAR-10 and MNIST datasets
CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet (Russakovsky et al., 2015). Enhancing the robustness of
models for these datasets is still an open challenge.
In this paper, we analyze the models trained using a state-of-the-art adversarial defense methodology
(Madry et al., 2018) and find that while these models show robustness at the input layer, the latent
layers are still highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks as shown in Fig 1. We utilize this property
to introduce a new technique (LAT) of fine-tuning the adversarially trained model. We find that
improving the robustness of the models at the latent layer boosts the adversarial accuracy of the
entire model as well. We observe that LAT improves the adversarial robustness by (∼ 4 − 6%) as
well as test accuracy by (∼ 1%) for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets.
Our main contributions in this work are the following:
• We study the robustness of latent layers of networks in terms of adversarial accuracy and
Lipschitz constant and observe that latent layers of adversarially trained models are still
highly vulnerable to adversarial perturbations.
• We propose a Latent Adversarial Training (LAT) strategy that significantly increases the
robustness of existing state-of-the art adversarially trained models (Madry et al., 2018) for
MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100 datasets. LAT can be used as a fine-tuning technique
which achieves significant level of adversarial robustness with just few epochs (∼ 2 − 5)
of additional training.
• We propose Latent Attack (LA), a new l∞ adversarial attack that is comparable to PGD on
multiple datasets. The attack exploits the non-robustness of in-between layers of existing
robust models to construct adversarial perturbations.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
For a classification network f , let θ be its parameters, y be the true class of n-dimensional input
x ∈ [0, 1]n and J(θ, x, y) be the loss function. The aim of an adversarial attack is to find the
minimum perturbation ∆ in x that results in the change of class prediction. Formally,
∆(x, f) := min
δ
||δ||p
s.t arg max(f(x+ δ; θ)) 6= arg max(f(x; θ))
(1)
It can be expressed as an optimization problem:
xadv = arg max
x˜:||x˜−x||p<
J(θ, x˜, y)
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In general, the magnitude of adversarial perturbation is constrained by a p-norm where p ∈
{0, 2,∞} generally to ensure that the perturbed example is close to the original sample. Various
other constraints for closeness and visual similarity (Rozsa et al., 2016; Xiao et al., 2018) have also
been proposed for the construction of adversarial perturbation. In terms of categorization of attacks,
there are broadly two type of adversarial attacks: White box and Black box attacks. White box at-
tacks assume complete access to the network parameters, while in the latter there is no information
available about network architecture or parameters. Some of the widely used adversarial attacks
include FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign Method) (Goodfellow et al., 2015) and PGD (Projected Gradient
Descent) (Madry et al., 2018). PGD is an iterative variant of FGSM.
While there has been extensive work in this area in the recent past (Yuan et al., 2019; Akhtar &
Mian, 2018), our focus in this work is on attacks which utilize latent layer representations. To the
best of our knowledge, in the only such earlier effort, (Sabour et al., 2016) proposed a method to
construct adversarial perturbation by manipulating the latent layer of different classes. However,
Latent Attack (LA) exploits the adversarial vulnerability of the latent layers to compute adversarial
perturbations, which has not been done before.
2.2 ADVERSARIAL DEFENSE
Popular defense strategies to improve the robustness of deep networks include the use of regulariz-
ers inspired by reducing the Lipschitz constant of the neural network (Tsuzuku et al., 2018; Cisse
et al., 2017). There have also been several methods which use Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs) (Samangouei et al., 2018) for classifying the input as an adversary. However, these defense
techniques have been shown to be ineffective to adaptive adversarial attacks (Athalye et al., 2018;
Logan Engstrom, 2018). Hence, we turn to an adversarial training strategy (Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Madry et al., 2018; Kannan et al., 2018), which injects adversarial examples in the training batch at
every step of the training. Adversarial training is among the current state-of-the-art in adversarial
robustness against white-box attacks. For a comprehensive review of other related work, we refer
the interested reader to (Yuan et al., 2019; Akhtar & Mian, 2018).
In our current work, we seek to enhance the robustness of each latent layer, thereby increasing the
robustness of the entire network. Previous efforts that are closest to ours include (Sankaranarayanan
et al., 2018; Cihang Xie, 2018). Our work is different from them on the following counts:
• (Cihang Xie, 2018) observe that the adversarial perturbations on images lead to noisy fea-
tures in latent layers. Inspired by this observation, they develop a new network architecture
that comprises of denoising blocks at the feature layer which aims at increasing the adver-
sarial robustness. However, we are leveraging the observation of low robustness at feature
layer to perform adversarial training for latent layers in order to achieve higher robustness.
• (Sankaranarayanan et al., 2018) proposes an approach to regularize deep neural networks
by perturbing intermediate layer activations. Their work has shown improvement in test
accuracy over image classification tasks as well as minor improvement in adversarial ro-
bustness with respect to basic adversarial perturbation (Goodfellow et al., 2015). However,
our work extensively focuses on the observation of the vulnerability of latent layers to a
small magnitude of adversarial perturbations. We have shown improvement in test accu-
racy and adversarial robustness with respect of state of the art adversarial attack (Madry
et al., 2018). We also propose a novel method for constructing adversarial perturbations.
3 ROBUSTNESS OF LATENT LAYERS
Mathematically, a deep neural network with l layers and f(x) as output can be described as:
f(x) = fl(fl−1(...(f2(f1(x;W1, b1);W2, b2)))...;Wl, bl) (2)
Here fi denotes the function mapping layer i−1 to layer i with weights Wi and bias bi respectively.
From Eq. 2, it is evident that f(x) can be written as a composition of two functions:
f(x) = gi ◦ hi(x) | 0 ≤ i ≤ l − 1
where f0 = I and hi = fi ◦ fi−1... ◦ f1 ◦ f0
gi = fl ◦ fl−1... ◦ fi+1
(3)
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We can study the behavior of f(x) to a slightly perturbed input by inspecting its Lipschitz constant,
Lf , which is defined such that Eq. 4 (below) holds for all ν.
||f(x+ ν)− f(x)|| ≤ Lf ||ν|| (4)
Having a lower Lipschitz constant ensures that the function’s output at perturbed input is not signif-
icantly different. This can be further translated to higher adversarial robustness as has been shown
by (Cisse et al., 2017; Tsuzuku et al., 2018). Moreover, if Lg and Lh are the Lipschitz constants of
the sub-networks gi and hi respectively, the Lipschitz constant of f has an upper bound defined by
the product of Lipschitz constant of gi and hi, i.e.
Lf ≤ Lg ∗ Lh (5)
Hence, we observe that having robust sub-networks helps in higher adversarial robustness for the
entire network.
For each latent layer i, we calculate an upper bound for the magnitude of perturbation in the sub-
network output (i) by observing the perturbation induced in latent layer for adversarial examples
xadv . To this end, we define i as:
i = Meanx∈test||hi(x)− hi(xadv)||∞ (6)
We compute the adversarial robustness of sub-networks {gi|1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1} using a PGD attack in
Eq 6, as illustrated in Fig 1.
We now describe our studies to analyze the robustness of latent layers in the popular datasets listed
below. For adversarial training, the examples are constructed using PGD adversarial perturbations
(Madry et al., 2018). 1 In the rest of this paper, by an adversarially trained model, we mean a model
that is trained using PGD adversarial examples as in (Madry et al., 2018). We define adversarial
accuracy of a model as the accuracy over the adversarial examples generated using the test-set of the
dataset. Higher adversarial accuracy corresponds to a more robust model.
• MNIST (Lecun et al., 1989): We use the network architecture as described in (Madry
et al., 2018). The naturally trained model achieves a test accuracy of 99.17% while the
adversarially trained model achieves a test accuracy of 98.4%.
• CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky et al., 2010): We use the network architecture as in (Madry et al.,
2018). The natural and adversarially trained model achieves test accuracies of 95.01% and
87.25% respectively.
• CIFAR-100 (Krizhevsky et al., 2010): We use the same network architecture as used
for CIFAR-10 with the modification at the logit layer to handle the number of classes in
CIFAR-100. The naturally trained model achieves a test accuracy of 78.07%, while the
adversarially trained model achieves a test accuracy of 60.38%.
All models were trained using code from (MadryLab, 2017a;b). Fig 1 shows the results.
We observe that for adversarially trained models, the adversarial accuracies of the sub-networks gi
are relatively less than that of the entire network f . The trend is consistent across all the different
datasets. (We note that layer depth index as shown in Fig 1 is relative as it does not correspond to
exact layer index in the model architecture. The sampled layers 1 were chosen uniformly across the
model architecture.) Also, in all our studies, the deepest layer tested is the layer just before the logit
layer and layer 0 corresponds to the input layer of f .
Fig 1 reveals that the sub-networks of an adversarially trained model are still vulnerable to adversar-
ial perturbations. In general, it reduces with increasing depth. An interesting observation, however,
is that robustness increases in the later layers of the network. The plots indicate that there is a scope
for improvement in the adversarial robustness of different sub-networks. In the next section, we
introduce our method that specifically targets at making gi robust. We find that this leads to a boost
in the adversarial and test performance of the whole network f as well.
To better understand the characteristics of sub-networks, we further analyze the subnetworks from
the viewpoint of their Lipschitz constants, as discussed before. Since our focus in on behavior of
1Code at: https://github.com/conference-submission-anon/LAT_adversarial_
robustness
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the function in a small neighborhood of input samples, we compute the Lipschitz constants of the
network f and sub-networks gi using the local neighborhood of input samples i.e.
Lf (xi) = maxxj∈B(xi)
||f(xj)− f(xi)||
||xj − xi|| (7)
where B(xi) denotes the  neighbourhood of xi. For computational reasons, inspired by (Alvarez-
Melis & Jaakkola, 2018), we approximate B(xi) by adding noise to xi as given in Eq. 6. We report
the Lipschitz constant values averaged over the test data for the considered datasets and models in
Fig. 1. The plot reveals that while for the adversarially trained model, the Lipschitz value of f
is lower than that of the naturally trained model, there is no such pattern in the sub-networks gi.
This observation again reinforces our hypothesis of the vulnerabilities of the different sub-networks
against small perturbations.
4 HARNESSING LATENT LAYERS
4.1 LATENT ADVERSARIAL TRAINING (LAT)
In this section, we seek to increase the robustness of the deep neural network, f . We propose
Latent Adversarial training (LAT) wherein both f and one of the sub-networks gi are adversarially
trained. For adversarial training of gi, we use a l∞ bounded adversarial perturbation computed via
the PGD attack at layer i with an appropriate bound as defined in Eq. 6. We propose LAT as a
fine-tuning technique which operates on an adversarially trained model to improve its adversarial
and test accuracy further. We observe that performing only a few epochs (∼ 5) of LAT on the
adversarially trained model results in a significant improvement over adversarial accuracy of the
model and reaches a state-of-the-art performance. Algorithm 1 describes our LAT training strategy.
Algorithm 1: Latent Adversarial Training (LAT): Algorithm to improve adversarial robustness of models
begin
Input: Adversarially trained model parameters - θ, Sub-network index which needs to be adversarially
trained - m, Fine-tuning steps - k, Batch size - B, Learning rate - η, hyperparameter ω
Output: Fine-tuned model parameters
for i ∈ 1, 2, ..., k do
Training data of size B - (X(i), Y (i)).
Compute adversarial perturbation ∆X(i) via PGD attack.
Calculate the gradients Jadv = J(θ,X(i) + ∆X(i), Y (i)).
Compute hm(X(i)).
Compute  corresponding to (X(i), Y (i)) via Eq. 6.
Compute adversarial perturbation ∆hm(X(i)) with perturbation amount 
Compute the gradients JlatentAdv = J(θ, hm(X(i)) + ∆hm(X(i)), Y (i))
J(θ,X(i), Y (i)) = ω ∗ Jadv + (1− ω) ∗ (JlatentAdv)
θ → θ − η ∗ J(θ,X(i), Y (i))
end
return fine-tuned model.
end
To test the efficacy of LAT, we perform experiments over CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and MNIST
datasets. We also compare our approach (LAT) against two baseline fine-tuning techniques with
the same amount of training period over the initial model: Adversarial Training (AT) (Madry et al.,
2018) and Feature Noise Training (FNT) where Algorithm 1 is used with gaussian noise to perturb
the latent layer.
Table 1 reports the adversarial accuracy corresponding to LAT and the baseline fine-tuning methods
over CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and MNIST datatsets. PGD Baseline corresponds to 10 steps of PGD
attack for CIFAR-10 and 100 and 40 steps of PGD attack for MNIST. We perform 2 epochs of
fine-tuning for MNIST, CIFAR-10 and 5 epochs for CIFAR-100 in all of the methods.
The results in Table 1 correspond to the best performing layers2. Note that the adversarially trained
model of CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets had adversarial accuracies of 47.04% and 23.01%
respectively.
2The results correspond to g11, g7 and g2 sub-networks for the CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and MNIST datasets.
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Adversarial Accuracy
Dataset Fine-tuningTechnique
PGD
Baseline
PGD
(100 steps) Test Acc.
CIFAR-10 Adversarial Training 47.12 % 46.19 % 87.27 %
Feature Noise Training 46.99 % 46.41 % 87.31 %
LAT (Our Approach) 53.84 % 53.04 % 87.80 %
CIFAR-100 Adversarial Training 22.72 % 22.21 % 60.38 %
Feature Noise Training 22.44 % 21.86 % 60.27 %
LAT (Our Approach) 27.03 % 26.41 % 60.94 %
MNIST Adversarial Training 93.75 % 92.92 % 98.40 %
Feature Noise Training 93.59 % 92.16 % 98.28 %
LAT (Our Approach) 94.21 % 93.31 % 98.38 %
Table 1: Adversarial accuracy for CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and MNIST datasets after fine-tuning by different
techniques
As can be seen from the table, that only after 2.5 epochs of training by LAT on CIFAR-10 dataset,
the adversarial accuracy jumps by ∼ 6.5%. Importantly, LAT not only improves the performance of
the model over the adversarial examples but also over the clean test samples, which is reflected by
an improvement of 0.6% in test accuracy. The same trend is visible for CIFAR-100 where training
via LAT for 5 epochs results in an increment of 4% and 0.6% in adversarial and test accuracy
respectively. Table 1 also reveals that the two baseline methods do not lead to any significant changes
in the performance of the model. As the adversarial accuracy of the adversarially trained model
for the MNIST dataset is already high (93.75%), our approach seems to not lead to significant
improvements (although there is a ∼ 0.46% improvement).
To analyze the effect of LAT on latent layers, we compute the robustness of various sub-networks
gi after training using LAT. Fig 1 shows the robustness with and without our LAT method for
CIFAR-10 and MNIST datasets. As the plots show, our approach not only improves the robustness
of f but also that of most of the sub-networks gi. A detailed analysis analyzing the effect of the
choice of the layer and the hyperparameter ω of LAT on the adversarial robustness of the model is
shown in Section 5.
4.2 LATENT ADVERSARIAL ATTACK (LA)
In this section, we seek to leverage the vulnerability of latent layers of a neural network to construct
adversarial perturbations. In general, existing methods for computing adversarial perturbations such
as FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) and PGD (Madry et al., 2018) operate by directly perturbing the
input layer to optimize the objective that promotes misclassification. In our approach, for given input
example x and a sub-network gi(x), we compute adversarial perturbations ∆(x, gi) on subnetworks
(latent layers), where i ∈ (1, 2, .., l). Here,
∆(x, gi) := min
δ
||δ||p where p ∈ {2,∞}
s.t arg max(gi(hi(x) + δ)) 6= arg max(gi(hi(x)))
(8)
Subsequently, we optimize the following equation to obtain ∆(x, f) for LA :
∆(x, f) = arg min
µ
|h(x+ µ)− (h(x) + ∆(x, gi)| (9)
We repeat the above two optimization steps iteratively to obtain our adversarial perturbation. A
pseudocode-level description of the proposed algorithm (LA) is given in Algorithm 2.
In order to study the performance of LA, we use PGD adversarial perturbation as a baseline attack.
The results are calculated with the constraint on the maximum amount of per-pixel perturbation as
0.3 for MNIST dataset and 8.0/256.0 for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. For MNIST and CIFAR-100,
our LA achieves adversarial accuracies of 90.78% and 22.87% respectively, whereas PGD (100
steps) and PGD (10 steps) obtains adversarial accuracies of 92.52% and 23.01% respectively. In
the case of CIFAR-10, LA achieves an adversarial accuracy of 47.46% and PGD (10 steps) obtains
adversarial accuracy of 47.41. The represented LA attacks are from the best layers, i.e., g1 for
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Figure 2: Plot showing effect of ω and layer
depth on the adversarial and test accuracy of f
Figure 3: Progress of Adversarial and Test Ac-
curacy for LAT and AT over 5 epochs of training
MNIST, CIFAR-100 and g2 for CIFAR-10. In general, we obtain better or comparable adversarial
accuracy when compared to the PGD attack.
Algorithm 2: Proposed algorithm for the construction of adversarial perturbation
begin
Input: Neural network model f , sub-network gm, step-size for latent layer αl, step-size for input layer
αx, intermediate iteration steps p, global iteration steps - k, input example x, adversarial perturbation
generation technique for gm
Output: Adversarial example x1 = x
for i ∈ 1, 2, ..., k do
l1 = gm(xi)
for j ∈ 1, 2, ..., p do
lj+1 = Projl+S (l
j + αl sign(∇gm(x)J(θ, x, y)))
end
x1adv = x
i
for j ∈ 1, 2, ..., p do
xj+1adv = Projxadv+S(x
j
adv − αxsign(∇x|gm(x)− lp|))
end
xi = xpadv
end
return xk.
end
5 DISCUSSION AND ABLATION STUDIES
To gain an understanding of LAT, we perform various experiments and analyze the findings in this
section. We choose CIFAR-10 as the primary dataset for all the following experiments.
Effect of layer depth and hyperparameter ω in LAT - We fix the value of ω to the best per-
forming value of 0.2 and train the model using LAT for different latent layers of the network. The
right plot in Fig 2 shows the influence of the layer depth in the performance of the model. It can be
observed from the plot, that the robustness of f increases with increasing layer depth, but the trend
reverses for the later layers. This observation can be explained from the plot in Fig 1, where the
robustness of gi decreases with increasing layer depth i, except for the last few layers.
For observing the influence of hyperparameter ω, we fix the layer depth to 11(g11) as it was the best
performing layer for CIFAR-10 and we show LAT result for different values of ω. This hyperpa-
rameter ω controls the ratio of weight assigned to the classification loss corresponding to adversarial
examples for g11 and the classification loss corresponding to adversarial examples for f . The left
plot in Fig 2 shows the result of this experiment. We find that the robustness of f increases with
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Figure 4: White-Box and Black-Box Adversarial accuracy on various  for different models on CIFAR-10(left)
and CIFAR-100(right) dataset
increasing ω. However, the adversarial accuracy does start to saturate after a certain value. The
performance of test accuracy also starts to suffer beyond this point.
Black-box and white-box attack robustness for various  - We test the black box and white-box
adversarial robustness of our best performing model for the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets over
various  values. To generate a black box adversarial perturbation, we train a separate model using
adversarial training and generate the perturbation for this model. The generated perturbation are
evaluated on our (LAT) model. Fig 4 shows the attack success accuracy. As can be seen, the LAT
trained model achieves better adversarial robustness for both the black box and white-box attacks
over a range of  values relative to the adversarially trained model. We also evaluated adversarial
robustness against banit optimization based black box attack (Ilyas et al.) and SPSA (Uesato et al.,
2018) with  = 12/255. LAT model has adversarial accuracy of 35.37% and 51.55% whereas
baseline model (AT) has adversarial accuracy of 25.64% and 46.65% respectively. Thus even on
stronger black box attacks our model outperforms the baseline. In Fig. 3, we show the adversarial
and test accuracy performance of the LAT and AT methods with the progress of training.
Different attack methods for LAT - Rather than crafting a l∞ bound PGD adversarial attack,
we craft a l2 bound PGD attack as well as use the FGSM attack to perturb the latent layers in LAT.
For the l2 bound PGD attack, doing LAT for 2.5 epochs achieved an adversarial and test accuracy of
88.02% and 53.46% respectively. Using FGSM to perform LAT did not lead to significant changes
as the model achieved 48.83% and 87.26% adversarial and test accuracies respectively. All the
results correspond to the g11 sub-network.
Random layer selection in LAT - Previous experiments over LAT corresponds to selection of
a single sub-network gi and adversarially training it. We conduct an experiment, where at each
training step of LAT, we randomly choose one of the [g5, g7, g9, g11] sub-networks to perform
adversarial training. The model performs comparably, achieving a test and adversarial accuracy of
87.31% and 53.50% respectively.
6 CONCLUSION
We observe that deep neural network models trained via adversarial training have sub-networks
vulnerable to adversarial perturbation. We described a latent adversarial training (LAT) technique
aimed at improving the adversarial robustness of the sub-networks. We verified that using LAT
significantly improved the adversarial robustness of the overall model for several different datasets
along with an increment in test accuracy. We performed several experiments to analyze the effect of
depth on LAT and showed higher robustness to Black-Box attacks. We proposed Latent Attack (LA),
an adversarial attack algorithm that exploits the adversarial vulnerability of latent layer to construct
adversarial examples. Our results show that the proposed methods that harness the effectiveness
of latent layers in a neural network beat state-of-the-art in defense methods, and offer a significant
pathway for new developments in adversarial machine learning.
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